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Journal Articles
The Value of Biased Information Forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science [Penultimate Draft] [Published Version] Accuracy and Credal Imprecision (joint work with Dominik Berger) Forthcoming in Noûs [Penultimate Draft] [Published Version] Accuracy and Ur-Prior Conditionalization Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1): 62-96. 2019. [Penultimate Draft] [Published Version] Object Reidentification and the Epistemic Role of Attention Ratio 31 (4): 402-414 (2018) [Penultimate Draft] [Published Version] Transparency and the KK Principle (joint work with Bernhard Salow) Noûs 52(1): 3-23 (2018) [Penultimate Draft] [Published Version] Lakṣaṇā as Inference Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):353-366 (2011) [Penultimate Draft] [Published Version] Critical Notices/Book Symposia A Problem for Ganeri's Buddhaghosa Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research The Importance of Being Modest Philosophy East and West 69 (3):870-879 (2019) [Published Version] Book Chapters, Encyclopaedia Entries, and Translations Transformative Choice and the Non-Identity Problem (with L. A. Paul) In Andrea Sauchelli (ed.) Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons; An Introduction and Critical Inquiry. Routledge, 2020. [Penultimate draft coming soon!] Udayana Ācārya's Flower-Offering of Reason. In Malcolm Keating (ed.) Controversial Reasoning in Indian Philosophy. Bloomsbury, 2020. {Penultimate draft coming soon!] Raghunātha on Arthāpatti In Malcolm Keating (ed.) Controversial Reasoning in Indian Philosophy. Bloomsbury, 2020. {Penultimate draft coming soon!] Vasubandhu's Twenty Verses with Auto-commentary (translated from the original Sanskrit) In G. Rosen, A. Byrne, J. Cohen, & S. Shiffrin (eds.), The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. W. W. Norton & Co., 2018. [Penultimate Draft] Śrīharṣa In Edward N. Zalta (ed.),The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition) [Published Version] Work in Progress (Email me for drafts) Gaṅgeśa on the Irreducibility of Absence In which I examine Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's (14th century CE) defence of the claim that absences are distinct from presences, e.g., material objects and their properties like colour and size. Gaṅgeśa on Perceiving Absence In which I examine Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's (14th century CE) defence of the claim that we can perceive absences. Bhaṭṭa Jayanta on Knowing that One Knows, Parts I and II In which I study Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's (9th century CE) anti-KK argument, i.e. a defence of the claim that we can't ascertain or learn that we know something without running an independent check (of some sort). |