Udayana Ācārya's *The Flower-Offering of Reason*

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INTRODUCTION

Udayana, active in the late tenth or early eleventh century CE, was an important transitional figure in the history of Nyāya.[1] Even though he remained deeply entrenched in the earlier Nyāya text tradition, his work influenced later Naiyāyikas like Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. Seven of his philosophical works are known to us. Three of these are commentaries. *The Purification of Meaning* (*Tātparya-pariśuddhi*) is an explanation of Vācaspati Miśra's sub-commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, *Notes on the Meaning of the Explanation of the Nyāya System* (*Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*). *The Appendix of* ~~Logic~~ (*Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa*) is a commentary on the fifth chapter of Gautama Akṣapāda's *Aphorisms of Logic* (*Nyāya-sūtra*). *The Row of Rays* (*Kiraṇâvalī*) is a gloss on Praśastapāda's commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, *A Compendium of the Properties of the Categories* (*Padârtha-dharma-saṃgraha*). Two of his non-commentarial works, *The Garland of Definitions* (*Lakṣaṇa-mālā*) and *The Row of Definitions* (*Lakṣaṇâvalī*), are summaries of Vaiśeṣika commitments about ontology. The other two works offer elaborate and highly original defenses of Nyāya views about the self and Īśvara. *The Discrimination of the Truth About the Self* (*Ātma-tattva-viveka*) defends the existence of a substantially real enduring self against Buddhist arguments. *The Flower-Offering of Reason* (*Nyāya-kusumânjali*) attempts to save theism from arguments given by Buddhists, Mīmāṃsakas, and Cārvākas. It is this last text that shall be our focus.

In the third chapter or *bouquet* (*stavaka*) of *The Flower-Offering of Reason*, Udayana wants to show that there is no good argument against theism, i.e., the claim that Īśvara, an omniscient creator god, exists. In verse 3.18, he considers a Mīmāṃsaka view in which *arthâpatti* can show that Īśvara doesn't exist. Here, the Mīmāṃsaka's argument goes like this: "If a benevolent Īśvara who desires humankind to adopt the path of *dharma* were to exist, then the existence of the Veda—which informs us about *dharma*—would be incongruous. For, in order to motivate people to adopt the path

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of *dharma*, Īśvara wouldn't need to create the Veda." In other words, the existence of the Veda is incongruous without the non-existence of Īśvara. Udayana rejects this argument. He claims that a benevolent Īśvara who wants human beings to adopt the path of *dharma* cannot motivate human beings to do so without producing in them the knowledge of what *dharma* consists in. But since this knowledge of *dharma* cannot arise out of empirical investigation alone, testimony is required. That is why Īśvara had to create the Veda which, for the Naiyāyikas since Jayanta and Vācaspati (both active in the ninth century CE) at least, is Īśvara's testimony on *dharma*.

Udayana follows this claim up with a completely general argument for reductionism about *arthâpatti*, i.e., the thesis that *arthâpatti* isn't an independent epistemic instrument. His aim, in this part of his argument, is to show that *arthâpatti* is just a kind of *anumāna*. Earlier in the same chapter, Udayana had argued that *anumāna* cannot refute the existence of Īśvara. It follows from Udayana's argument, therefore, that it is a mistake on the part of the Mīmāṃsaka to appeal to *arthâpatti* as an independent source of counter-evidence against theism.

Udayana's strategy for defending reductionism about *arthâpatti* is this. Suppose *arthâpatti* is just a kind of *anumāna*. Since *anumāna* requires prior empirical knowledge of pervasion (*vyāpti*), then this means an agent engaging in *arthâpatti* must proceed from such knowledge. The Mīmāṃsakas typically resist this claim by arguing that no such empirical knowledge of a generalization is required for *arthâpatti*. What produces *arthâpatti*-based knowledge is something else: what they called *incongruity-otherwise* (*anyathânupapatti*) (see Ollett and Freschi in this volume, p. xxx). In *A Flower-Offering of Reason* (*Nyāya-kusumâñjali*), Udayana explains why the Mīmāṃsakas' conceptions of incongruity-otherwise cannot help them reject a reductionist view about *arthâpatti*. Udayana deals with three distinct ways of defending an anti-reductionist view about *arthâpatti*. On the first view, instances of *arthâpatti*-based knowledge are based on an awareness of a certain relation of metaphysical dependence between two entities. Udayana argues that the relevant relation of metaphysical dependence is just a relation of pervasion. On the second view, instances of *arthâpatti*-based knowledge are based on the conflict between two epistemic instruments. Udayana shows that either this view is incoherent or leads to a problem of overgeneration. On the third view, instances of *arthâpatti*-based knowledge are produced by what the Nyāya philosophers called negative-only *anumāna*s, but these inferences[2] aren't genuine *anumāna*s at all. Udayana argues that these inferences are indeed *anumāna*s.

TRANSLATION

The opening verse

And *arthâpatti* is not distinct from *anumāna*, since there are no pure examples of *arthâpatti* available in common experience, and there is no *arthâpatti* that is of a different kind from *anumāna*. ~~This is because~~:

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[2] The term "inference" is used in this translation to refer to any episode of reasoning, so it will not only cover *anumāna*s but also instances of inductive or abductive reasoning that cannot properly be treated as kinds of *anumāna*.

3.19ab. That which cannot be regulated (*aniyamya*) cannot be incongruous; neither can that which doesn't regulate (*aniyantā*) make anything congruous.

3.19cd. Nor ~~can there be~~ a conflict between two epistemic instruments. Otherwise, ~~even well-known cases of *anumāna* would have to be treated as cases of *arthâpatti*,~~

COMMENTS: In this passage, Udayana offers two distinct arguments for why *arthâpatti* is not an independent epistemic instrument. The first argument is just that there are no pure or unmixed (*asaṃkīrṇa*) examples of *arthâpatti*-based knowledge available in common experience. For many Naiyāyikas (though it's not clear whether Udayana agrees), instances of knowledge that are produced by distinct epistemic instruments form distinct natural kinds and therefore instantiate distinct natural kind properties (*jāti*). Therefore, if *arthâpatti* and *anumāna* were distinct epistemic instruments, then instances of *anumiti* and instances of *arthâpatti*-generated knowledge would form distinct natural kinds and would instantiate distinct natural kind properties. Moreover, Udayana thinks that natural kinds can't cross-cut each other: there cannot be two natural kinds K1 and K2 such that (i) there are instances of K1 that aren't instances of K2, (ii) there are instances of K2 that aren't instances of K1, and (iii) there are instances of K1 that are instances of K2.[3]

The second argument is that there is no difference in kind between *arthâpatti* and *anumāna*. As Udayana's commentators, Varadarāja and Vardhamāna, note, *arthâpatti* can be distinct from *anumāna* in kind (*prakāra*) only if it differs from *anumāna* either with respect to the causal factors (*sāmagrī*) or the causal operation (*vyāpāra*) by which it gives rise to knowledge, or with respect to the effect (*phala*)—i.e., the knowledge—that it produces.

Despite the Mīmāṃsaka's traditional appeal to incongruity-otherwise (*anyathânupapatti*) (see Ollett and Freschi in this volume, p. xxx), Udayana argues that it cannot distinguish between *arthâpatti* and *anumāna* in the relevant way. There are two conceptions of incongruity-otherwise: metaphysical and epistemological. On the metaphysical conception, incongruity-otherwise consists in a relation of metaphysical dependence; on the epistemological conception, it consists in a conflict between two epistemic instruments. 3.19ab targets the metaphysical conception of incongruity-otherwise. It says that if incongruity-otherwise consists in a relation of metaphysical dependence, then that which is incongruous must be something that is regulated—i.e., pervaded—by that which makes it congruous. So, incongruity-otherwise is just a relation of pervasion. 3.19cd targets the epistemological conception of incongruity-otherwise. The claim is that there cannot be any conflict between two epistemic instruments as the Mīmāṃsaka suggests. If there were such a conflict, then even well-known instances of *anumāna* would have to be treated as cases of *arthâpatti*. The upshot then is that there is no good way for the Mīmāmsaka to show that there are pure

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[3] See his discussion of cross-cutting (*sāṃkarya*) as a constraint on natural kind properties (*jāti-bādhaka*) in *The Row of Rays* in J. S. Jetly (ed.), *Praśastapādabhāṣyam* (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971), 23.

examples of *arthâpatti*-based knowledge or that there is a difference in kind between *arthâpatti* and *anumāna*. The rest of Udayana's discussion is an elaboration of this argument.

The argument against incongruity-otherwise

They [the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas] offer an example: "That living Caitra isn't at home is incongruous without his presence outside, and therefore implies his presence outside."

With respect to that example, the following is being considered. What is it about the absence of a living person from his house that is incongruous? A non-regulable entity cannot be incongruous without something that doesn't regulate. For, otherwise, there would be a problem of overgeneration.

THE BHĀṬṬA MĪMĀṂSAKA: The very nature of a living person's absence from his home is incongruous. The living person's absence at his home isn't brought about by his presence outside, since it isn't an effect of his presence outside. The nature of a living person's absence from his home is such that it wouldn't obtain unless he were present outside his home.

THE NAIYĀYIKA: If this is correct, then a living person's absence from his home, by nature, is indeed something that is regulated by that person's presence outside his home. This is because "incongruity" here just refers to a relation of pervasion determined on the basis of absence (*vyatireka-mukha-nirūpyā*). How else could the living person's presence outside his home make his absence from his home congruous? That which doesn't regulate cannot make congruous that which isn't regulated by it. For, otherwise, there would indeed be a problem of overgeneration (*atiprasaṅga*).

THE BHĀṬṬA MĪMĀṂSAKA: The nature of ~~a living person's absence from home~~ is such that it can ~~only~~ obtain insofar as it involves that person's presence elsewhere.

THE NAIYĀYIKA: Then, this very same relation of pervasion which is determined on the basis of presence (*anvaya-mukha-nirūpyā*) is called "incongruity."

COMMENTS: In verse 3.19ab, Udayana's target is the metaphysical conception of incongruity-otherwise. He says: "That which cannot be regulated cannot be incongruous; neither can that which cannot regulate make anything congruous." Udayana explains the thought as follows. In any case of incongruity-otherwise, there is some object X that is incongruous (*anupapanna*) and needs to be made congruous (*upapādya*), and there is some other entity Y without which X is incongruous and which makes X congruous (*upapādaka*). In the Devadatta example, the property of being alive but absent from home is incongruous and needs to be made congruous. By contrast, the property of being outside one's home is that without which the property of being alive but absent from home is incongruous and which, therefore, makes this property congruous.

The passage under consideration is intended to be a commentary on 3.19ab. In this passage, Udayana makes two claims. The first is that unless there is a relation of pervasion that connects X with Y, X cannot be incongruous without Y.

Udayana puts this point in terms of regulation (*niyama*): X is regulated by Y if and only if there is a relation of (positive or negative) pervasion between X and Y, i.e., either X is regularly accompanied by Y or the absence of Y is regularly accompanied by the absence of X. Udayana claims that unless X is regulated in this sense by Y, X cannot be incongruous without Y. Why? There is a quick argument right at the beginning of the passage: if a relation of pervasion weren't necessary for X to be incongruous without Y, then anything would be incongruous without everything else. Thus, there would be a problem of overgeneration.

However, this doesn't show that incongruity actually consists in such a relation of pervasion. So, Udayana goes on to make a second, stronger claim: namely, that incongruity of this kind must consist in a relation of pervasion. For any two properties X and Y, the incongruity of X without Y must consist in either

i. X's being caused by Y, or
ii. the nature of X being such that either (a) X wouldn't be instantiated by an object unless Y were also instantiated by it, or (b) whenever X is instantiated by an object, Y is also instantiated by it.

Then, the claim is that (i) cannot be what incongruity-otherwise consists in. In cases where Devadatta's presence is inferred from his being alive and his absence from home, Devadatta's property of being alive but absent from home isn't obviously caused by his being outside. Moreover, if this proposal about incongruity-otherwise were correct, then even prototypical *anumāna*s like the one from smoke to fire could be treated as cases of *arthâpatti*. For, there too, smoke, insofar as it is caused by fire, would be incongruous without fire.

This leaves us with (ii). Here, once again, there are two possibilities. Consider (a): suppose the incongruity of X without Y consists in the nature of X being such that X wouldn't be instantiated by an object unless Y were also instantiated by it. In the Devadatta example, this would mean that the property of being alive but absent from home has a nature such that it wouldn't be instantiated by a person unless that person also instantiated the property of being outside his home. This, according to Udayana, is just a relation of pervasion determined on the basis of absence (*vyatireka-mukha-nirūpyā vyāpti*). Udayana's commentators, Varadarāja and Vardhamāna, take this to be a relation of negative pervasion (*vyatireka-vyāpti*): whenever a person is not present outside his home, he is either not living or not absent from his home.[4] But, on another interpretation, it could be a relation of pervasion that is determined on the basis of negative correlation (*vyatireka-sahacāra*), i.e., by observing cases where both the property to be proven and the reason are absent.[5]

Similarly, if (b) were right, then the incongruity of X without Y would consist in X's having a nature such that X obtains only if Y also obtains. In the

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[4] See Upādhyāya and ~~Dhundhirāja~~ (1957: 419–20).

[5] In his *Tātparya-pariśuddhi*, Udayana himself uses the term *vyatireka-mukhena* in this way at several places: see especially his explanation of the term in the context of his discussion of negative-only *anumāna* (1996: 214).

Devadatta example, this would mean that the property of being alive but absent from home has a nature such that it is instantiated by a person only if that person also instantiates the property of being outside his home. This, according to Udayana, is equivalent to the claim that, between those two properties, there is a relation of pervasion that is determined on the basis of presence (*anvaya-mukha-nirūpyā vyāptiḥ*). On the interpretation favored by Udayana's commentators, this is a relation of positive pervasion: whenever a person is alive and absent from his home, that person is also present outside his home. But it could also be a relation of pervasion determined on the basis of positive correlation (*anvaya-sahacāra*), that is, by observing cases where both the reason and the property to be proven are present. If Udayana's argument succeeds, then incongruity-otherwise consists of some relation of pervasion, positive or negative. This, in turn, will lend support to the hypothesis that instances of *arthâpatti*-based knowledge are just instances of *anumiti* that are based on the agent's prior knowledge of a generalization. Udayana next addresses three objections.

First Bhāṭṭa objection: no need for awareness of incongruity

THE BHĀṬṬA MĪMĀṂSAKA: We don't deny that some kind of pervasion is present in cases of *arthâpatti*; rather, we deny that an awareness of such pervasion is present. However, a relation of pervasion cannot, in virtue of its existence alone, make the inference an *anumāna*.

THE NAIYĀYIKA: No. For in cases of *arthâpatti*, the awareness of incongruity-otherwise has to be admitted. Otherwise, there would be a problem of overgeneration (*atiprasaṅga*) and there would be no room for pseudo-*arthâpatti*. One falls into an error of this sort only when one takes something that is congruous otherwise to be incongruous otherwise; in other cases, there is no such error.

COMMENTS: The Bhāṭṭa objects that it is incongruity-otherwise that yields *arthâpatti*-based knowledge; the awareness of such incongruity may not be necessary. By contrast, in order to gain knowledge by *anumāna*, not only does there have to be a relation of pervasion between the reason and the property to be proven, but the agent must also have a recollective awareness of that pervasion. So, the Bhāṭṭa could just grant that the incongruity-otherwise consists in a relation of pervasion, but deny that an agent requires an awareness of that pervasion in order to gain *arthâpatti*-based knowledge.

Udayana's reply is that if the Bhāṭṭas don't take awareness of incongruity-otherwise to be necessary for *arthâpatti*, there will be two problems. The first is a problem of overgeneration: the proposal will predict that there is *arthâpatti*-based knowledge in cases where there isn't any. For instance, suppose you don't think that the property of being alive but absent from home is incongruous without one's presence outside, but you just judge (on the basis of guesswork) that Devadatta is outside after learning that he's alive and absent from home. This view will predict that your judgment is an instance of *arthâpatti*-based knowledge. For the property of being alive but absent from home is in fact incongruous without the property of being outside one's home. The second problem for the

Bhāṭṭas revolves around cases of pseudo-*arthâpatti*, where people make judgments by *arthâpatti*-like reasoning because they falsely think that one property is incongruous without another. For example, even though Devadatta is dead, you might judge that he's outside his home after not finding him at home, because you falsely think that the property of being absent from home is incongruous without the property of being outside. Such episodes of pseudo-*arthâpatti* are possible, precisely because it is possible for agents like us to make inferences which internally resemble good cases of *arthâpatti* in virtue of involving the same steps of reasoning, but which, unlike good cases of *arthâpatti*, crucially involve a false awareness of incongruity-otherwise. But if an awareness of incongruity-otherwise weren't necessary for *arthâpatti*, such cases of pseudo-*arthâpatti* would be hard to accommodate. Next, Udayana addresses a second Bhāṭṭa objection.

The second objection: the relation of pervasion cannot be apprehended

The Mīmāṃsaka: Even so, how is the relation of pervasion apprehended in this case?

The Naiyāyika: This is established by everyone's perceptual experience: "When I am here, then I am not elsewhere; when I am elsewhere, then I am not here." Why should there even be a "how"-question here? It's also not true that since not all regions of space are perceptible, it is impossible to ascertain the absence of a thing from those regions. For, in one's own case, one can ~~learn that one is not~~ in contact with any of those other regions of space.

The Mīmāṃsaka: How can one perceive that one is not in contact with imperceptible things?

The Naiyāyika: If one perceives that one object is not related to the other, then one can know by *anumāna* that the former is not related to any of the parts of the latter. However, the same isn't true of things that are not parts of anything. For instance, it is impossible to ascertain that an object is not related to certain atoms unless those atoms are material causes of composite objects (i.e., parts of composite objects).

COMMENTS: How can one know, in the Devadatta example, that there is a relation of pervasion between the reason and the property to be proven? Udayana's answer is that one learns this just as one learns that fire pervades smoke by observing that smoke is correlated in certain ways to fire. In cases of positive correlation (*anvaya-sahacāra*), smoke is present along with fire. In cases of negative correlation (*vyatireka-sahacāra*), fire is absent, and so is smoke. As Udayana seems to suggest, it is not difficult to observe these kinds of correlation in the Devadatta example.

In that example, the putative reason is the property of being alive but absent from one's home, and the putative property to be proven is the property of being outside one's home. Imagine that I am located inside my home. So, I might observe, "When I am here (i.e., inside my house), I am not elsewhere (i.e., outside the house)." This judgment shows that I am able to observe cases of negative correlation between the reason and the property to be proven, i.e., cases where a

living person *is not* absent from home and at the same time *is not* present outside their home. Moreover, I might also recall previous experiences, where I was not inside my house and was present elsewhere. So, I might think, "When I am not here (i.e., inside my house), I am present elsewhere (i.e., outside the house)." The second judgment (if correct) demonstrates that I have observed cases of positive correlation, i.e., cases where a living person is absent from home but also is present outside. However, in order to know by perception that I am here at home and not elsewhere, I must perceive in myself the absence of contact with all other regions of space except my home. Here, the Mīmāṃsaka might point out that the Naiyāyikas themselves are committed to the principle that an agent can perceive the absence of an entity *e* only if *e* itself is perceptible. In the example mentioned above, I am supposed to perceive myself as not being in contact with all regions of space outside my home. But contact with all regions of space outside my home is not a perceptible property, since not all regions of space are simultaneously perceptible (at least to an ordinary human being). So, in order to accommodate his view, Udayana must explain how we can perceive one thing as characterized by the absence of another imperceptible thing.

In response, Udayana adopts a subtle strategy. He points out some perceptible objects have imperceptible parts: for example, a perceptible middle-sized object might be composed of atoms that are themselves imperceptible. Now, it is possible for us to perceive that one middle-sized object, e.g., a pot, isn't in contact with another middle-sized object, e.g., a cloth. From this, Udayana claims, it is possible for me to infer that the pot isn't in contact with the atoms that the cloth is composed of. The same goes for space and its regions. So, Udayana's claim is that even if I cannot perceive myself as not being in contact with all regions of space outside my home, it is still possible for me to perceive myself as not being in contact with the perceptible composite region of space outside my home, and infer from that that I am not in contact with all regions of space outside my home. Therefore, even though it may not be possible to directly observe the negative correlation between the property of being alive and absent from home and the property of being outside home, it may still be possible to know by inference that there are such cases. However, such an inference isn't available for things that aren't parts (or material causes) of other perceptible composite things: for instance, I cannot know by a similar inference that a pot isn't in contact with atoms that aren't parts of any perceptible middle-sized objects. Udayana now considers a last objection to his view.

The third objection: the presence of the ground in the site cannot be known by perception

THE NAIYĀYIKA CONTINUES: Moreover, it is also unreasonable to say that even though *arthâpatti* brings about knowledge of the property to be proven through the mediation of the agent's certainty about a relation of pervasion, it doesn't require the presence of the reason in the subject. For, if that were so, we would end up with the undesirable consequence that the presence of the reason in the subject is causally unnecessary for *arthâpatti*-based knowledge. But there is no difference between

arthâpatti and *anumāna* in this respect. And one cannot ascertain that there obtains a relation of pervasion between the reason and the property to be proven unless they are present in the same loci. If the reason and the property to be proven weren't present in the same loci (i.e., at the same place, time, etc.), we would not be able to ascertain a relation of pervasion expressible in the form, "That which possesses smoke possesses fire," or in the form, "Wherever there is smoke there is fire," or in the form "Whenever there is smoke there is fire."

> COMMENTS: Kumārila argues that in the Devadatta example, you can't know by perception that the reason is present in the subject.[6] There are two possibilities: either (i) the subject is Devadatta and the property to be proven is the property of being present outside, or (ii) the subject is the property of being present outside and the property to be proven is Devadatta himself. Now, what then is the reason? There are four possibilities: either (a) it is Devadatta himself characterized by his absence from home, (b) it could be the house characterized by Devadatta's absence, (c) it could be the absence of Devadatta from home, or (d) it could be the non-observation of Devadatta's absence. But none of these entities reside either in Devadatta or in his property of being outside his home. So, the reason isn't present in the subject at all.
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> However, the Naiyāyika would argue there is indeed a subject—namely, Devadatta—and a reason—the property of being alive but absent from home—in this scenario such that the reason is present in the subject. Udayana goes on to point out that if the Mīmāṃsaka were to argue that *arthâpatti* does not involve the presence of the reason in the subject, then the presence of the reason in the subject would be causally unnecessary for *arthâpatti*. Udayana replies that the same could be said about cases of *anumāna*, because (if Udayana's arguments so far are sound) there is no other relevant difference between the two epistemic instruments. So, the presence of the reason in the subject would also be causally unnecessary for *anumāna*. That's a bad result by everyone's lights. Second, it is impossible to ascertain that a reason is related to a property to be proven by a relation of pervasion, unless the two occur in the same loci. This is because the relation of pervasion between a reason and property to be proven consists in the invariable occurrence of the property to be proven in any object or at any spatio-temporal location where the reason occurs. That is why statements of such relations of pervasion involve quantifiers like "wherever," "whenever," and so on.
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> Udayana's argument so far has only targeted the metaphysical conception of incongruity-otherwise. What about the epistemological conception? On this view, for any two properties X and Y, Y is incongruous without X if and only if, given that the presence of Y in an object o is known by some epistemic instrument, if X weren't posited, then the epistemic instrument by which the presence of Y in o is known ~~conflicts~~ with some other epistemic instrument. Udayana next turns to this topic.

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[6] See Ollett and Freschi in this volume, p. xxx. Verses 10–18 in the *Arthâpatti-pariccheda* in Śāstrī (1978: 321–2).

*The argument against incongruity-otherwise from the sameness
of object requirement*

THE MĪMĀṂSAKA: When two epistemic instruments conflict with each other, *arthâpatti* is what demonstrates that there is no such conflict (*avirodhôpapādika*). *Anumāna* isn't like this.

THE NAIYĀYIKA: If there were a conflict between two epistemic instruments, one of them would be rebutted just as in the case of the rope and the snake. Both couldn't have the status of an epistemic instrument. Alternatively, if both were to have the status of an epistemic instrument, then there wouldn't be a conflict, either (i) because the properties that they ascribe to the same object can be ~~instantiated~~ together just as in the case of an awareness-event of the form "This middle-sized thing is one," or (ii) because they are about distinct objects just as in the case of ~~awareness-events of the form "This is Caitra" and "This is Maitra."~~

> COMMENTS: As Udayana notes, it's not clear how one epistemic instrument can conflict with another. First, if there is a genuine conflict between two epistemic instruments, then one epistemic instrument could rebut another. In a case where you misperceive a piece of rope as a snake, your awareness-event (*jñāna*) has the content, "That's a snake." As you come closer, you see that it's only a piece of rope, and the content of your perceptual awareness-event is, "That's a piece of rope." The two awareness-events conflict with each other. Since your second perceptual awareness-event has the status of knowledge, it rebuts the means by which the earlier awareness-event arose. Udayana's claim is that, similarly, if one epistemic instrument were to conflict with another, then one would rebut the other.
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> Second, Udayana endorses the principle that two epistemic instruments can conflict with each other only if they ascribe incompatible properties to the same object. Udayana's claim is that two epistemic instruments cannot satisfy this requirement of conflict. The awareness-event produced by any epistemic instrument is always true. If two epistemic instruments were to conflict with each other, then, by this requirement of conflict, the contents of the awareness-events they produce couldn't be true together.
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> Typically, in cases of apparent conflict between two epistemic instruments, one of the two conditions for epistemic conflict fails—either their being about the same object, or the properties being genuinely incompatible. In the case where the agent undergoes ~~two awareness-events of the form, "This is Caitra" and "This is Maitra,"~~ Caitra and Maitra are distinct persons, so the property of being Caitra cannot be instantiated together with the property of being Maitra. But since the two occurrences of the demonstrative "this" pick out two distinct objects, there is no conflict between the two epistemic instruments. In the other case, the agent undergoes an awareness-event of the form, "This middle-sized thing is one." Even though "this" picks out just one object, e.g., a pot, middle-sizedness and oneness can be instantiated together, so there is no epistemic conflict. The implicit claim here is that in the Devadatta example, the agent undergoes two awareness-events of the form, "Devadatta exists somewhere" and "Devadatta isn't at home."

Even though the awareness-events are of the same object, the property of being absent from home isn't incompatible with the property of being present somewhere. By the aforementioned requirement of conflict, therefore, there cannot be any conflict between the two relevant epistemic instruments.

A response

The Mīmāṃsaka: In the relevant scenario, the house enters into the extension of "some place" in the awareness-event of the form "There is some place where he exists," due to its generality. So, there is sameness of objects.

The Naiyāyika: If this is so, there is no conflict here, just as there is no conflict between two awareness-events of the form, "There is some place where he exists" and "There is some place where he doesn't exist."

The Mīmāṃsaka: In this scenario, too, there indeed is a conflict.

The Naiyāyika: Then, the agent should hold on to only one of these awareness-events.

The Mīmāṃsaka: The agent needn't hold on to only one of these awareness-events, since *arthâpatti* makes both congruous.

The Naiyāyika: What then is incongruous?

The Mīmāṃsaka: The conflict, which is itself incongruous otherwise, establishes the two awareness-events as being about different objects.

The Naiyāyika: Why does it not establish the awareness-events as being about the same object?

The Mīmāṃsaka: Here, establishing involves showing that there is no conflict. The conflict between these two awareness-events arises insofar as they are about the same object. How can it be resolved in virtue of that very property of the two awareness-events? It is not the case that someone who is rendered unconscious by some poison can be revived by means of that very poison.

The Naiyāyika: How does one know that the two awareness-events conflict in virtue of having the same object?

The Mīmāṃsaka: The nature of every ~~(existing)~~ object is found to be such that it is located at distinct places (i.e., it is never present at one place but also absent from it).

The Naiyāyika: Well, this is just a kind of pervasion. In that case, you end up in the proverbial predicament of a daybreak at the tax booth.

COMMENTS: In response to Udayana's objection, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas might try to show there is indeed a conflict between the two epistemic instruments in the Devadatta example. They might say that, when an agent undergoes an awareness-event of the form "Devadatta is alive," the content of this awareness-event can be understood as, "There is some place where Devadatta exists." The existential quantifier "some place" ranges over all possible places, so it covers

Devadatta's house. In this sense, this awareness ascribes to Devadatta's house the presence of Devadatta. When the agent then notices Devadatta's absence at his house, she undergoes an awareness-event of the form, "Devadatta's house is a place where he doesn't exist." This awareness ascribes to Devadatta's house the absence of Devadatta. Thus, the two awareness-events ascribe two incompatible properties to the same object, i.e., Devadatta's house. Hence, as the Mīmāṃsaka notes, there is sameness of objects in this case. Since the two conditions laid down by the aforementioned requirement of conflict are satisfied, a conflict between the two epistemic instruments can arise.

Udayana argues that, if this is right, then there would be a conflict between the epistemic instrument that gives rise to an awareness-event of the form "There is some place where Devadatta exists" and an epistemic instrument that gives rise to the awareness-event of the form "There is some place where Devadatta doesn't exist." By the Mīmāṃsaka's own reasoning, the quantifier "some place" in both awareness-events ranges over Devadatta's house. So, the two awareness-events ascribe two incompatible properties to the same object—, i.e., Devadatta's house. But Udayana thinks that there is no such conflict here.

As Udayana is quick to notice, the Mīmāṃsaka could indeed bite the bullet and argue that there is indeed a conflict between the two epistemic instruments, which the agent is able to resolve by positing that the place where Devadatta is present is distinct from the place from he is absent. This would show that these two awareness-events are in fact about distinct places, so there is no conflict. As a result, the agent would be able to accept the contents of both these awareness-events as true.

Anticipating this move, Udayana goes on to ask how, in this case, an agent can know that there is a conflict between the two epistemic instruments. Note that the conflict arises only if one takes "some place" in both awareness-events to mean the same place. But in order to recognize that there is a conflict in this way, the agent must know that, if someone exists at a certain place, then that person isn't absent from it. But this is just a relation of pervasion. Thus, the agent's knowledge of incongruity-otherwise—insofar as it consists in her knowledge of the conflict between two epistemic instruments—is nothing but knowledge of a certain relation of pervasion. Udayana here compares the Mīmāṃsaka to a thief who wants to evade taxes on stolen goods: in order to cross the river without paying taxes, he sets out in the dark of the night, but is ultimately caught by the tax-collector when day breaks near a tax booth (*ghaṭṭa-kuṭī*) on the riverside.

The argument from overgeneration

THE NAIYĀYIKA CONTINUES: Alternatively, smoke too would make known the presence of fire in virtue of being incongruous. For it is indeed not congruous without fire. Moreover, there could be a conflict of the following kind: "since there is smoke, there must be fire (on the hill), and since fire isn't observed, it must be absent." Here, *arthâpatti* helps us establish that non-observation of fire pertains to the front part of the hill, and that smoke has as its object the presence of some fire that is unobservable due to distance. Why would this be a case of *anumāna*?

The Mīmāṃsaka: The agent's awareness of the form "This possesses fire" arises out of an *anumāna* which is based on a relation of pervasion. Otherwise, if there were no *anumāna*, there would be no conflict. However, the awareness of the form "There is fire on the other side of the hill"—which arises due to the conflict with the non-observation of fire on the front part of the hill—is indeed derived from an *arthâpatti*.

The Naiyāyika: No. The conflict in question has been formulated with respect to the epistemic instrument by which the agent apprehends the relevant relation of pervasion. Furthermore, the latter epistemic instrument (which establishes that there is fire on the other side of the hill) is also not *arthâpatti*. Otherwise, *arthâpatti* would also establish the presence of chaff fire on the basis of a conflict between whiteness and the property of not being produced from chaff.

The Mīmāṃsaka: This is not so, because there is a relation of pervasion between white smoke and chaff fire.

The Naiyāyika: If this is correct, then how can the previous example be a case of *arthâpatti*? For there is a relation of pervasion between smoke that is characterized by unobserved fire on the front part of the hill and fire that is present on the other side of the hill. So, the two cases are similar.

COMMENTS: Udayana now arrives at the objection that he raises in 3.19cd against the claim that incongruity-otherwise consists in a conflict between two epistemic instruments. His worry is that if incongruity-otherwise just consists the conflict between two epistemic instruments as Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas think, then certain well-known cases of *anumāna* would have to be treated as instances of *arthâpatti*.

Udayana points out that, in the standard *anumāna* from smoke to fire, smoke could be treated as incongruous without fire, so this *anumāna* could be treated as an *arthâpatti*. This is not convincing: while this could be true on the metaphysical conception of incongruity-otherwise, it's not obvious that there is a conflict between two epistemic instruments in this case. Anticipating this worry, Udayana describes another example involving an agent who doesn't see any fire on the front part of the hill but, on seeing some smoke coming out of the other side of the hill, infers the presence of fire on that side. Udayana wants to say that this is a case of *anumāna*. The hill is the subject of the *anumāna*, and the property to be proven is the property of having fire on the other side. The reason is the property of no fire on the front part but having smoke. However, Udayana points out that the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka would have to treat this case as a case of *arthâpatti*. On one reconstruction of the case, this is exactly like the Devadatta example: there are two epistemic instruments, namely non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) and *anumāna*. By non-perception of fire on the front side of the hill, the agent arrives at an awareness-event of the form "That place contains no fire." Then, by *anumāna*, the agent arrives at an awareness-event that is verbalizable as, "That place contains fire." By the requirement of conflict mentioned earlier, these two awareness-events could conflict with each other if "that place" referred to the same place, e.g., the hill. But, by *arthâpatti*, the agent could resolve this conflict by determining that "that place" refers to different parts of the hill in the two

awareness-events. As a result, she could thereby come to know that there is fire on the other side of the hill. This, then, would be a case of *arthâpatti*; there won't be any need for appealing to an *anumāna*.

In response, the Mīmāṃsaka might point out that we have to appeal to *anumāna* in order to generate the conflict between the two epistemic instruments, since *anumāna* is one of the epistemic instruments here. However, the final awareness that there is fire on the other side of the hill could still be a product of *arthâpatti.* But, as Udayana notes, even that is not necessary. There is a different epistemic instrument here: namely, the epistemic instrument by which the agent learnt that there is a relation of pervasion between fire and smoke. This produces the knowledge that all places that contain smoke must also contain fire. The quantifier "all places that contain smoke" ranges over the hill which is a place that contains smoke. Now, if "that place" in the previous sentence refers to the hill, there could be a conflict here due to the aforementioned requirement of conflict. So, the conflict can be generated without appealing to any *anumāna*.

In response, the Mīmāṃsaka could just admit that this is a case of *arthâpatti* which doesn't involve any *anumāna*. But this response would only work if this case were an isolated case. There are other such cases, such as the one involving white smoke and chaff fire. This is a straightforward case of *anumāna*. But Udayana thinks that the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka can be forced to say that this is a case of *arthâpatti.* Suppose, in that case, the agent first learns by *anumāna* that there is *some kind* of fire on the hill (where the quantifier "some kind of fire" ranges over chaff as well as non-chaff fire), but then notices that the smoke on the hill is white. Since she knows that all places that contain white smoke contain chaff fire, this generates a conflict between the two epistemic instruments with respect to the particular hill. In order to resolve this conflict, the agent would have to posit that the hill contains only chaff fire. Moreover, as Udayana goes on to say, if the Mīmāṃsaka tries to say that this is not a case of *arthâpatti* (since it requires the agent to know that there is a relation of pervasion between white smoke and chaff fire), the same could be said about the earlier case. For there too the agent must know that the property of containing smoke without containing fire on the front part is pervaded by the property of containing fire on the other side.

The Mīmāṃsaka now raises a final worry about the reductionist view.

The final objection and Udayana's response

The Mīmāṃsaka: *Arthâpatti* is ~~just~~ what others recognize as negative-only *anumāna*. For, in such cases, there is an absence of positive correlation.

The Naiyāyika: We will not object to the application of the label "*arthâpatti*" to particular varieties of *anumāna*.

The Mīmāṃsaka: Why should they be called "*anumāna*"?

The Naiyāyika: Because they arise out of a reason that doesn't obtain without the property to be proven. The property of not obtaining without a property to be proven is common to reasons of both positive-only and negative-only varieties. The ascertainment of this property is either due to the observation of both positive and

negative correlations, or instances of either. Hence, it is correct to say that the expression "*arthâpatti*" is just a synonym of "*anumāna*," or refers to a particular variety of *anumāna*, like the expression "*pūrvavad,*" ~~etc.~~ (*anumāna* from cause to effect)*.*

COMMENTS: At least in some cases of *arthâpatti*, no positive correlation between the reason and the property to be proven is observed.[7] In such cases, an agent can only know the relevant relation of pervasion by observing a negative correlation between the two. If that is correct, then, for a Naiyāyika who accepts reductionism about *arthâpatti*, any such instance of *arthâpatti*-based knowledge must be produced by an *anumāna* of the negative-only variety. Udayana's imagined Mīmāṃsaka generalizes this claim and says that all instances of *arthâpatti*-based knowledge might indeed be produced by what the Naiyāyikas call an *anumāna* of the negative-only variety.

Udayana points out that the Naiyāyikas may indeed be happy with this view. For *arthâpatti* would just be a kind of *anumāna*.[8] However, the Bhaṭṭas don't recognize inferences of this kind as *anumāna*s. Kumārila argues that inferences of this kind are defective, since the reason in inferences of this sort suffers from a defect known as uncommonness (*asādhāraṇatva*), i.e., it isn't known to be present anywhere apart from the subject.[9] But in order to arrive at an *anumiti*, the agent must antecedently know, and therefore be certain, that there is no place where the reason is present but the property to be proven absent. In order to gain such certainty, the agent must observe both positive and negative correlations between the reason and the property to be proven. Merely observing cases of this second kind cannot help us rule out this possibility. For this leaves open the possibility that there are unobserved cases (including the subject) where the property to be proven is absent and the reason is present.[10] So, we cannot arrive at an *anumiti* by observing a negative correlation between the reason and the property to be proven.

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[7] See Ollett and Freschi in this volume, p. xxx. Sanskrit: verses 35–46 of his *Chapter on arthâpatti*.

[8] Udayana himself defends the necessity of negative-only *anumāna*s in *A Row of Rays*. The argument is basically that a chief function of any definition (*lakṣaṇa*) is to lay down a property by which one can distinguish instances of a kind K from things that don't belong to that kind K. Udayana argues that the defining property that is common to all and only instances of K can only do so by becoming the reason of an *anumāna* like "Earth is different from what is not earth, because it has earthhood." But here the reason—earthhood—is present only in the subject, so there is no object—other than the subject—where the reason and the property to be proven are both present. Hence, this has to be a negative-only *anumāna*. For the relevant passages, see Jetly (1971: 29).

[9] See verses 86–88 in the *Anumāna-pariccheda* in Śāstrī (1978: 266–7).

[10] It is unclear why this is true. Even though Kumārila doesn't explain this, the same issue is discussed by Buddhist epistemologists such as Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. At *Pramāṇa-vārttika* II.11–13, Dharmakīrti discusses a *śeṣavat anumāna*, i.e., an *anumāna* that proceeds from ~~a cause to an effect,~~ "All living beings have attachment, etc., because they have bodies." Here, the body is supposed to be the ~~cause~~ of attachment, etc. Here, the subject includes all living beings: hence, there is no place—other than the subject—where the reason and the property to be proven are present together. Hence, there are no cases of positive correlation. Dharmakīrti argues that an agent cannot ascertain that the presence of a body is pervaded by attachment, etc., merely because she doesn't observe any cases where a person with a body lacks attachment, etc. For the absence of counter-evidence cannot be sufficient to generate the certainty that this relation of pervasion holds. Dharmakīrti compares this to a case where a person concludes that there is no uncooked rice on a plate because she doesn't observe any uncooked rice. See Gnoli (1960: 8–10).

Here Udayana repeats the standard Nyāya response to this concern. If an agent is to know by *anumāna* the presence of a property to be proven in a subject from her observation of a reason, then she must know that the reason doesn't deviate from the property to be proven, i.e., isn't present at a place from which the property to be proven is absent. This feature of the reason, according to Udayana, can be known not only by observing its positive correlation with the property to be proven, but also by observing its negative correlation with that property, or both positive and negative correlations. So, *arthâpatti* ends up being synonymous with, or just a variety of, *anumāna*.

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